Teamsters local 959 jobs

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This is something Carol enjoys as well, helping both internal and external customers in her role. She is new to the Membership position here at Teamsters Local and feels very blessed to work somewhere where her degree can be most effective and put to good use.

For the past nine years, she worked for an Appliance Distributor on the order desk, and prior to that she spent eleven years as a waitress at a Country Club. She comes from a long history of customer service and enjoys working with people. She is excited to be working at Local and looks forward to meeting and getting to know all of the great Teamster members. Since then, she has worked tirelessly in support of the members of Teamsters Local despite having never met most of them. She looks forward to the end of the pandemic, when she can cheerfully greet members in our office once again!

Janet comes to us from the dental field, where she worked in customer service for years. She has a passion for helping people, and is fluent in both English and Spanish. Acts or threats of violence against one employee may violate the rights of other employees to make free choices to exercise or to refrain from exercising their rights to collective bargaining, self organization, etc. NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, F. Thus any threats or coercion against Arlo Wells which others may have learned about may have led to an unfair labor practice, because it could have intimidated other employees from making free choices.

Donna was a supervisor with the power to fire employees. The NLRB recognized that an employer frequently draws a collective bargaining representative from the existing pool of supervisors. See Operating Eng'rs, U. Thus, we conclude that the union's activities are arguably unfair labor practices within the National Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction.

Both parties rely on Farmer v. United Bhd. In Farmer, the Supreme Court addressed the question whether an action in state court against a union for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted by federal labor law.

The lower court had sustained a demurrer to allegations of discrimination in union hall referrals and breach of contract on the ground that they were preempted by federal law, but allowed the case to go to trial on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The Supreme Court found that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was not preempted. In examining the state interest which permitted exceptions to the general rule of preemption the Supreme Court stated: Nothing in the federal labor statutes protects or immunizes from state action violence or the threat of violence in a labor dispute, Automobile Workers v.

Russell, U. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Petitioner's complaint in Farmer alleged that defendants had intentionally engaged in "outrageous conduct, threats and intimidations, and words" which caused "him to suffer grievous mental and emotional distress as well as great physical damage. The Supreme Court responded that "[w]ith respect to [his] claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, we cannot conclude that Congress intended exclusive jurisdiction to lie in the Board.

The State, on the other hand, has a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from the kind of abuse of which Hill complained. That interest is no less worthy of recognition because it concerns protection from emotional distress caused by outrageous conduct, rather than protection from physical injury, as in Russell, or damage to reputation, as in Linn [v. Plant Guard Workers, U.

First, the emotional distress must be based on "outrageous" conduct, rather than "on the type of robust language and clash of strong personalities that may be common place in various labor contexts. Second, "state trial courts have the responsibility Here the action in the superior court was based not on the union's coercion of Wells through its actions, but on the outrageous manner in which it was done.

It was a suit based on threats of violence. The threat to Wells' life and the constant intrusions into his family affairs constituted outrageous conduct. Local argues that the trial court erred by ruling that, as a matter of law, a threat to one's life is outrageous conduct, thus removing from the jury's consideration the question whether its conduct was "outrageous.

Those elements were: 1 "That defendant Teamsters Local threatened plaintiff's life and 2 that the threat was a proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff. But it argues that here the court in effect gave Wells a directed verdict on a key element of his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Local argues that the instruction constitutes plain error. It additionally argues that the instruction on the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress erroneously ignored another element that Local acted in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that emotional distress would follow i. Wells responds that any failure to include specific reference to outrageous conduct in the jury instructions was effectively cured by another of the trial court's instructions which defined "severe emotional distress" at the damage stage as "emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable person in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.

In Richardson v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, P. Thus, the elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are: 1 the conduct is extreme and outrageous, 2 the conduct is intentional or reckless, 3 the conduct causes emotional distress, and 4 the distress is severe. In response to Local 's objections to the court's instructions on the emotional distress claim the superior court stated in part: [I]f we don't have a cause of action on behalf of someone whose life is directly threatened by someone else, then I think we're back into the middle ages.

I find as a matter of law that making a threat to take someone's life is, as a matter of law, outrageous conduct which is sufficient basis on which to find and award for severe emotional distress, and that I therefore need not instruct the jury We agree with the superior court's analysis and affirm its conclusion that there was no issue as to outrageous conduct to submit to the jury.

Whether emotional distress is reasonably foreseeable is determined by the objective standard of what a reasonably prudent person should foresee. Wells contends that "it is clear that any reasonable person in a civilized society should foresee the reasonable probability that severe emotional distress would occur from a threat on another's life. Local argues that the trial court erred in admitting Lew Hahn's testimony concerning episodes of violence aimed at him while he was working for Odom during the strike.

It argues that his testimony was not relevant because none of the violent acts against Hahn were aimed at Wells, and that even if the evidence was relevant, its prejudicial nature outweighed its probative value. Wells contends that while Hahn's testimony may not have been relevant to the issue of whether or not Local engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct toward Wells, it "was relevant to the issue of whether Wells suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the threat to his life, the intensity and duration of the emotional distress, and whether he acted reasonably in terminating his union membership because of the threat.

We hold that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. Hahn's testimony was for the most part cumulative: Wells himself testified that he had knowledge of some of the incidents mentioned, including "windows being shot out," "bullet holes in doors and vehicles," and "tires being slashed.

Moreover, attached to its trial brief, Local included a copy of Wells' affidavit to the NLRB, which referred to statements made by Lew Hahn and others regarding the violence that occurred during the Odom strike. At trial Local moved that this affidavit be admitted in evidence. While Hahn's testimony was more detailed than Wells', it was corroborative of Wells' state of mind, and it gave the jury particular details with which Wells was familiar all of which assisted the jury in determining whether Wells' contention of emotional distress was plausible.

Thus, we hold that the probative value of Hahn's testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect. Local argues that the superior court erred in denying its motion for a new trial or remittitur. The Local based its motion on the lack of evidence that Wells was physically injured and the scant evidence of his emotional distress. His affidavit and testimony both disclose that fear. Wells testified he was frightened, his wife testified he sounded shook up, and his affidavit stated: The only reason I'm here in Seattle, is because I am in fear of my life based on my prior experiences with the teamsters and the violent acts that have occurred during the Odom strike.

This award cannot be said to be either unreasonable or the result of undue passion or prejudice. The focus of Local 's challenge to the superior court's decision to deny it a new trial or remittitur is that the jury was swayed by prejudice and passion in reaching its special verdicts. The Local complains of Wells' counsel's remarks to the jury, and of the superior court's failure to give a cautionary instruction.

The same can be said of the alleged failure of the trial court to give the jury a cautionary instruction regarding counsel's allegedly improper argument. Local 's argument with regard to the trial court's jury instruction on punitive damages parallels its argument concerning the court's instructions on the elements of the emotional distress claim. Local claims that the trial court erred in not explicitly instructing the jurors that they must find outrageous conduct or reckless indifference before assessing any punitive damages.

For the same reasons that we concluded that the superior court's instruction pertaining to Wells' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress did not constitute error, we conclude that its instruction regarding punitive damages also did not constitute plain error.

The Local points to testimony which it claims indicates that Wells' past lost earnings were based on his employer's decision to require its drivers to be independent truck drivers, rather than because of his withdrawal from the union. If, however, Wells had remained a union driver, he would not have been required to acquiesce to the employer's demand that he become an independent truck driver, and therefore he could have continued to receive hourly union wages, even if he had to work for another employer.

Although he had been working during the period in question, he had essentially no reported income because of expenses. In our view, the jury's separate treatment of past and future lost earnings does not reveal passion or prejudice. The superior court ordered the jury to disregard counsel's remark.

The superior court asked counsel if there would be any objections to its statement to the jury to that effect. Local 's counsel did not object to the manner of the superior court's response. The union itself did not raise the issue in its motion. It argues that Wells should have presented evidence of the union's wealth.

It further argues that because of judgment in this suit the union had to file a petition in bankruptcy. Our problem with this argument is that by not raising the issue in the superior court, the Local gave the court no opportunity to consider the issue. In such circumstances we hold that the superior court cannot be said to have abused its discretion in denying the motion for remittitur or new trial. Arlo did not picket Odom initially because he was too busy; the union took no action against him for his failure to picket until contacted by Sierer.

These incidents scared Wells. In response he armed himself with a. The jury was unanimous on the special verdicts for emotional distress damages, past lost earnings, future lost earnings, and present value of lost retirement benefits. Two jurors disagreed on the award of punitive damages. I disagree. They plead different legal theories for each cause of action, but they're all essentially exactly not essentially; they're all based on exactly the same conduct and the same occurrences.

I see no Federal preemption whatsoever because there's no allegation that the union was acting in allegedly threatening Arlo Wells' life with the intent to affect the exercise of any collective bargaining rights on his part. There's absolutely no allegation to that effect. Kennelly has disavowed any intent to make any such showing at trial; he would not be permitted to do so because, indeed, that would place the case within the Federal preemption doctrine.

Here, it's just as though the union were a complete outsider vis-a-vis Mr. The union, through its agents, allegedly made threats on Arlo Wells' life for purposes which had no connection whatsoever to his right to exercise his Federal collective bargaining rights under the National Labor Relations Act. I think that's essential for Federal preemption; it's absent here.

The motion is denied. The only claim for relief on which the superior court instructed the jury was intentional infliction of emotional distress. Thus we agree with Wells' contention that the question of whether the claims for assault and breach of fiduciary duty were preempted has been mooted. Jones, U. Garmon, supra, [ U. Carpenters, U. Although the "Garmon guidelines [are not to be applied] in a literal, mechanical fashion," Sears, supra, at [98 S.

Farmer v. When, however, the conduct at issue is only a peripheral concern of the Act or touches on interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, it could not be inferred that Congress intended to deprive the State of the power to act, we refuse to invalidate state regulation or sanction of the conduct.

Garmon, supra [ U. The question of whether regulation should be allowed because of the deeply rooted nature of the local interest involves a sensitive balancing of any harm to the regulatory scheme established by Congress, either in terms of negating the Board's exclusive jurisdiction or in terms of conflicting substantive rules, and the importance of the asserted cause of action to the state as a protection to its citizens. See, Sears, supra [ U. Farmer, supra, [ U.

International Bhd. United Constr. Perko, U. It distinguished between claims based on union activity that was itself regulated by federal law, and claims based on the manner in which the union conducted its activities. Union discrimination in employment opportunities cannot itself form the underlying "outrageous" conduct on which the state court tort action is based; to hold otherwise would undermine the pre-emption principle.

Nor can threats of such discrimination suffice to sustain state court jurisdiction. It may well be that the threat, or actuality, of employment discrimination will cause a union member considerable emotional distress and anxiety.

But something more is required before concurrent state court jurisdiction can be permitted. Simply stated, it is essential that the state tort be either unrelated to employment discrimination or a function of the particularly abusive manner in which the discrimination is accomplished or threatened rather than a function of the actual or threatened discrimination itself.

A demands that B pay over the proceeds of his rubbish collection, and tells B that if he does not do so the association will beat him up, destroy his truck, and put him out of business. B is badly frightened, and suffers severe emotional distress. A is subject to liability to B for his emotional distress, and if it results in illness, A is also subject to liability to B for his illness.

Buell, U. International Business Mach. In Brown Jug we held that Alaska courts have jurisdiction over tort actions for trespassory picketing. Alto Riviera Apartments, 60 Cal. Extreme and outrageous conduct is conduct which goes beyond all possible bounds of decency so as to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.

The rough edges of our society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind.

An actor intends to inflict emotional distress if he desired to inflict severe emotional distress, or where he knew that such distress was certain or substantially certain to result from his conduct. Here the jury found that Local threatened Wells' life and that this threat proximately caused "severe emotional distress," which was defined as "emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quantity that no reasonable person in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.

B suffers severe emotional distress. A is subject to liability to B for her emotional distress It is highly unlikely that a reasonable juror would not conclude that the union should have known that threatening Wells' life would cause emotional distress. Thus, it appears unlikely that the jury's verdict would have differed on this issue. Zartman, P.

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First, they have to check the Teamsters Local call board, a roster of qualified union members who are available to work. If a union member with the right classification is willing and available, the production will hire them. End of story. If no union members are available, however, the production is free to pursue other leads, which means that they can hire non-union labor.

If you want to accumulate your 30 days this way, your best bet is to begin by building a network that can connect you to the right kinds of opportunities. Signatory production companies or production professionals who frequently work on signatory productions may be able to put you in direct touch with hiring opportunities.

But, you might consider getting to know current members of Teamsters Local If you happen to be working one of these union organized productions, you might be able to achieve Teamsters Local eligibility in no time flat. The CSATF is a non-profit organization that carries out a variety of services on behalf of unions and laborers in the entertainment industry. One of these services is to organize and maintain the IER, which is a database of union-qualified workdays for individual laborers seeking union qualification.

Your membership will become official only after the union votes to approve your application and you swear an oath of obligation to the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. To learn more about Teamsters Local , check out their official website. If you use Wrapbook, the software offers the ideal payroll solution for union and non-union filmmakers alike.

Disclaimer At Wrapbook, we pride ourselves on providing outstanding free resources to producers and their crews, but this post is for informational purposes only as of the date above. The content on our website is not intended to provide and should not be relied on for legal, accounting, or tax advice.

You should consult with your own legal, accounting, or tax advisors to determine how this general information may apply to your specific circumstances. His work has been commissioned by a diverse range of clients- from Havas Worldwide to Wisecrack, inc. Through a background that blends project development with physical production across multiple formats, Loring has developed a uniquely eclectic skillset as a visual storyteller.

Present at the meeting were Sierer, Wells, and a man named "Jack. Arlo related this conversation to Donna and asked her if she could give him the information. Donna, angered by the suggestion, told him she would not give him or anybody else such information. When they got into their car the Wellses noticed "someone writing something down like he was taking [their] license down. He identified himself as a Teamster. The man followed them to their neighborhood, where they dropped Dougherty off.

Wells next had contact with the union on November 3, , when he was told by his picket captain to see Sierer at his office. Wells met with Sierer and Jack. Sierer asked Wells why he failed to inform the union about his conversation with Dougherty at the airport.

Wells responded that the only information he gave Dougherty was what everyone had already read in the newspapers. Sierer told Wells he did not believe that Wells did not have information about Odom from conversations with his wife. Jack told Wells that if he "was the man of the house" he would have gotten the union the information. Sierer asked Wells if he knew Odom's stock level in its Fairbanks warehouse, whether Odom had another warehouse and its location, and if he knew of any shipments that were coming in or what Odom's shipments were.

He told Sierer he did not know. Sierer again asked Wells to have Donna either quit her job or give the union information. Wells, with Jack present, again asked Donna for the information. On November 6, , Sierer once again told Wells that he wanted Donna to quit her job.

He said that the union would find her another one. When Arlo discussed this with Donna, she became angry at him for bringing the union's demands home, and told him she liked her job and did not want to quit. Three days later Arlo received a call from Sierer stating that he wanted to see him, but when Wells arrived for the meeting, Sierer was not there.

Later that day Sierer told him to see him the next morning. At the next day's meeting, Sierer apologized for putting so much pressure on Wells and asked him to meet with a business agent about finding Donna a job with Alascom. On November 12, Sierer asked Wells to come to his office, where they met alone.

Sierer told him that he wanted Donna either to quit or to take a day leave of absence, because the strike would be over within 30 days. He also stated that the union would not get Donna a job at Alascom because it was not the union's job to get jobs for non-union people. He told Wells that if Donna did not quit or take a leave of absence, the union would come down hard on him and he knew what it meant when the union comes down hard on people.

Sierer told him that this directive came from the main office in Anchorage and mentioned John Forceskie and Mike McKenna, both from the Anchorage office. He then told him, "This is not a threat but your life is not worth your wife's wages and your wife better not show up to work the next morning.

He called his wife, who testified that he sounded shook up, to tell her about the threat. Wells was upset and scared. But Wells, fearing for her safety, contacted one of Donna's co-workers to give her a ride because he did not want her to be recognized driving her own vehicle. Donna contacted Odom's labor consultant, and asked him for advice.

Donna arranged for Arlo to go to the union hall with a lawyer to withdraw his union membership. Arlo took a lawyer with him because he "was afraid Over the following weekend Wells was "very upset" and "afraid. Wells knew of the violence associated with the strike from conversations with Donna, Lew Hahn Donna's co-worker , and Bill Brown, an Odom salesman. Donna told him that bullet holes were found in the warehouse doors, and tires were flattened in front of the warehouse daily.

Brown told Wells of personal threats by Teamster drivers. Hahn told him of numerous incidents of violence that had occurred to him and his property. He formally resigned from the union in February, From March until October, , he made the same hourly wages as a union truck driver would have made prior to the strike.

He has never attempted to rejoin the Teamsters. If he returned to work with the union by , he would need to work 1, hours in a two-year period to become vested. Wells' claims for relief against Local were tried before a jury. The superior court instructed the jury that to recover Wells had to prove that Local had threatened his life and that the threat had proximately caused damage to him. The trial court further instructed that if Wells were entitled to recover compensatory damages, he was to be awarded the amount which would reasonably compensate him for: 1.

The jury found that Local had threatened Wells' life entitling him to compensatory damages. Local contends that the superior court erred in refusing to dismiss Wells' claims for assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty. Local moved to dismiss these claims on the ground that they were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. Prior to trial the superior court denied the motion to dismiss.

The seminal case establishing the scope of federal preemption in the area of labor relations is San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, U. There the Supreme Court stated: When the exercise of state power over a particular area of activity threatened interference with the clearly indicated policy of industrial relations, it has been judicially necessary to preclude states from acting.

Or where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act. The first issue to be determined is whether the union's activity was arguably within the scope of the NLRB's jurisdiction.

It first contends that "any violence or threat against [a union] member could arguably constitute coercion and restraint within the meaning of [section] 8 b 1 A. Third, it argues that it was a restraint on the company's selection of Donna as its representative for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances. Wells argues that "Local threatened his life because Donna would not either quit her employment with Odom Company, against whom the union was on strike, or disclose confidential information concerning Odom to the union" and because Donna Wells is not a party to the action no preemption can occur.

In our view the union's activities are arguably within the ambit of the NLRA. Acts or threats of violence against one employee may violate the rights of other employees to make free choices to exercise or to refrain from exercising their rights to collective bargaining, self organization, etc.

NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, F. Thus any threats or coercion against Arlo Wells which others may have learned about may have led to an unfair labor practice, because it could have intimidated other employees from making free choices. Donna was a supervisor with the power to fire employees. The NLRB recognized that an employer frequently draws a collective bargaining representative from the existing pool of supervisors.

See Operating Eng'rs, U. Thus, we conclude that the union's activities are arguably unfair labor practices within the National Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction. Both parties rely on Farmer v. United Bhd. In Farmer, the Supreme Court addressed the question whether an action in state court against a union for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted by federal labor law. The lower court had sustained a demurrer to allegations of discrimination in union hall referrals and breach of contract on the ground that they were preempted by federal law, but allowed the case to go to trial on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

The Supreme Court found that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was not preempted. In examining the state interest which permitted exceptions to the general rule of preemption the Supreme Court stated: Nothing in the federal labor statutes protects or immunizes from state action violence or the threat of violence in a labor dispute, Automobile Workers v.

Russell, U. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Petitioner's complaint in Farmer alleged that defendants had intentionally engaged in "outrageous conduct, threats and intimidations, and words" which caused "him to suffer grievous mental and emotional distress as well as great physical damage. The Supreme Court responded that "[w]ith respect to [his] claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, we cannot conclude that Congress intended exclusive jurisdiction to lie in the Board.

The State, on the other hand, has a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from the kind of abuse of which Hill complained. That interest is no less worthy of recognition because it concerns protection from emotional distress caused by outrageous conduct, rather than protection from physical injury, as in Russell, or damage to reputation, as in Linn [v.

Plant Guard Workers, U. First, the emotional distress must be based on "outrageous" conduct, rather than "on the type of robust language and clash of strong personalities that may be common place in various labor contexts. Second, "state trial courts have the responsibility Here the action in the superior court was based not on the union's coercion of Wells through its actions, but on the outrageous manner in which it was done. It was a suit based on threats of violence.

The threat to Wells' life and the constant intrusions into his family affairs constituted outrageous conduct. Local argues that the trial court erred by ruling that, as a matter of law, a threat to one's life is outrageous conduct, thus removing from the jury's consideration the question whether its conduct was "outrageous.

Those elements were: 1 "That defendant Teamsters Local threatened plaintiff's life and 2 that the threat was a proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff. But it argues that here the court in effect gave Wells a directed verdict on a key element of his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Local argues that the instruction constitutes plain error.

It additionally argues that the instruction on the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress erroneously ignored another element that Local acted in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that emotional distress would follow i. Wells responds that any failure to include specific reference to outrageous conduct in the jury instructions was effectively cured by another of the trial court's instructions which defined "severe emotional distress" at the damage stage as "emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable person in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.

In Richardson v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, P. Thus, the elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are: 1 the conduct is extreme and outrageous, 2 the conduct is intentional or reckless, 3 the conduct causes emotional distress, and 4 the distress is severe. In response to Local 's objections to the court's instructions on the emotional distress claim the superior court stated in part: [I]f we don't have a cause of action on behalf of someone whose life is directly threatened by someone else, then I think we're back into the middle ages.

I find as a matter of law that making a threat to take someone's life is, as a matter of law, outrageous conduct which is sufficient basis on which to find and award for severe emotional distress, and that I therefore need not instruct the jury We agree with the superior court's analysis and affirm its conclusion that there was no issue as to outrageous conduct to submit to the jury. Whether emotional distress is reasonably foreseeable is determined by the objective standard of what a reasonably prudent person should foresee.

Wells contends that "it is clear that any reasonable person in a civilized society should foresee the reasonable probability that severe emotional distress would occur from a threat on another's life. Local argues that the trial court erred in admitting Lew Hahn's testimony concerning episodes of violence aimed at him while he was working for Odom during the strike.

It argues that his testimony was not relevant because none of the violent acts against Hahn were aimed at Wells, and that even if the evidence was relevant, its prejudicial nature outweighed its probative value. Wells contends that while Hahn's testimony may not have been relevant to the issue of whether or not Local engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct toward Wells, it "was relevant to the issue of whether Wells suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the threat to his life, the intensity and duration of the emotional distress, and whether he acted reasonably in terminating his union membership because of the threat.

We hold that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. Hahn's testimony was for the most part cumulative: Wells himself testified that he had knowledge of some of the incidents mentioned, including "windows being shot out," "bullet holes in doors and vehicles," and "tires being slashed. Moreover, attached to its trial brief, Local included a copy of Wells' affidavit to the NLRB, which referred to statements made by Lew Hahn and others regarding the violence that occurred during the Odom strike.

At trial Local moved that this affidavit be admitted in evidence. While Hahn's testimony was more detailed than Wells', it was corroborative of Wells' state of mind, and it gave the jury particular details with which Wells was familiar all of which assisted the jury in determining whether Wells' contention of emotional distress was plausible. Thus, we hold that the probative value of Hahn's testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect.

Local argues that the superior court erred in denying its motion for a new trial or remittitur. The Local based its motion on the lack of evidence that Wells was physically injured and the scant evidence of his emotional distress. His affidavit and testimony both disclose that fear. Wells testified he was frightened, his wife testified he sounded shook up, and his affidavit stated: The only reason I'm here in Seattle, is because I am in fear of my life based on my prior experiences with the teamsters and the violent acts that have occurred during the Odom strike.

This award cannot be said to be either unreasonable or the result of undue passion or prejudice. The focus of Local 's challenge to the superior court's decision to deny it a new trial or remittitur is that the jury was swayed by prejudice and passion in reaching its special verdicts. The Local complains of Wells' counsel's remarks to the jury, and of the superior court's failure to give a cautionary instruction.

The same can be said of the alleged failure of the trial court to give the jury a cautionary instruction regarding counsel's allegedly improper argument. Local 's argument with regard to the trial court's jury instruction on punitive damages parallels its argument concerning the court's instructions on the elements of the emotional distress claim.

Local claims that the trial court erred in not explicitly instructing the jurors that they must find outrageous conduct or reckless indifference before assessing any punitive damages. For the same reasons that we concluded that the superior court's instruction pertaining to Wells' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress did not constitute error, we conclude that its instruction regarding punitive damages also did not constitute plain error.

The Local points to testimony which it claims indicates that Wells' past lost earnings were based on his employer's decision to require its drivers to be independent truck drivers, rather than because of his withdrawal from the union. If, however, Wells had remained a union driver, he would not have been required to acquiesce to the employer's demand that he become an independent truck driver, and therefore he could have continued to receive hourly union wages, even if he had to work for another employer.

Although he had been working during the period in question, he had essentially no reported income because of expenses.